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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, at least three women a day are killed by
their husbands or boyfriends.1 A woman is assaulted or beaten every
nine seconds in the United States, making domestic violence the lead-
ing cause of injury to women.2 But domestic violence against women
is not always limited to just the woman herself. Beyond “just” abusing
women, between forty to sixty percent of men who abuse women also
abuse children.3 Children living in a home with domestic violence are
1,500 times more likely to be abused themselves.4
From a legal perspective, domestic violence poses many chal-
lenges to the criminal justice system, including many evidentiary
1. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS, http://domesticviolencestatistics.org/domestic
-violence-statistics/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
2. Id.
3. Kathy Luttrell Garcia, Note, Battered Women and Battered Children: Admissibility
of Evidence of Battering and its Effects to Determine the Mens Rea of a Battered Woman
Facing Criminal Charges for Failing to Protect a Child from Abuse, 24 UNIV. LA VERNE J.
JUV. L. 101, 102 (2003–04) (citations omitted).
4. Id.
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issues.5 The complexities of domestic violence cases also present
unique challenges for prosecutors.6 Within this backdrop, Dr. Lenore
Walker7 developed the Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS).8 BWS has
since been used in many domestic violence cases9 and as part of self-
defense claims when victims turn on their batterers.10
It should be acknowledged at the outset that this Note accepts
BWS as an important and worthy development in criminal law.11 It
also assumes that BWS is a real, psychological condition worthy of
proper legal protections without foreclosing the possibility of legal pro-
tections independent of a medical “syndrome.”
The purpose of this Note is to assess and apply evidentiary princi-
ples to statutory permissions of expert testimony on BWS. Several
states have developed evidentiary rules that specifically permit the
use of expert testimony on BWS in domestic violence and self-defense
cases.12 This Note will argue that the Federal Rules of Evidence should
embrace a similar statutory permission of expert testimony on BWS
5. See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1243 (8th Cir. 1991); People v.
Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 583–84 (Cal. 2004).
6. See Matthew P. Hawes, Note, Removing the Roadblocks to Successful Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions: Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome
in Ohio, 53 CLE. ST. L. REV. 133, 134 (2005–06) (noting that “[i]n a conventional criminal
case the prosecution can expect to rely on the cooperation and participation of the victim
to obtain a conviction. In a domestic violence case, however, the prosecution will often en-
counter victims who refuse to testify, recant previous statements, or whose credibility
is attacked with questions on why they remained in a battering relationship.”) (foot-
notes omitted).
7. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55–70 (1979).
8. Some debate remains over the proper terminology. See, e.g., Brown, 94 P.3d at 580;
People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 7 n.3 (Cal. 1996). The use of “syndrome” can connote
a sense that victims of domestic violence suffer from an illness. Brown, 94 P.3d at 580.
As a result, some modern commentators prefer “expert testimony on battering and its
effects” or “expert testimony on battered women’s experience.” Id. In Humphrey, the court
noted that
[d]omestic violence experts have critiqued the phrase ‘battered woman’s
syndrome’ because (1) it implies that there is one syndrome which all bat-
tered women develop, (2) it has pathological connotations which suggest that
battered women suffer from some sort of sickness, (3) expert testimony on
domestic violence refers to more than woman’s psychological reactions to
violence, (4) it focuses attention on the battered woman rather than on the
batterer’s coercive and controlling behavior and (5) it creates an image of
battered women as suffering victims rather than as active survivors.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 7, n.3 (citation omitted). For purposes of this Note, though,
“battered women’s syndrome” (BWS) will be the exclusive terminology.
9. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., Humphrey, 921 P.2d at 13; Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 6 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 621–22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
11. Whereas the effectiveness of BWS in criminal practice may be debated, its impact
is nonetheless assumed for purposes of this Note.
12. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West
2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (West 2013).
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with the policy purpose of increasing the number of states that rec-
ognize such an evidentiary rule. The ultimate goal is that through
greater statutory codification of BWS, domestic violence cases and
cases involving an affirmative claim of self-defense based on BWS can
be successfully litigated.
I. OVERVIEW OF BATTERED WOMEN’S SYNDROME
A “battered woman” is “one who assumes responsibility for a
cycle of violence occurring in a relationship, where the abuser (a hus-
band or boyfriend) has told her that the first violent episode was her
fault.”13 General characteristics of BWS ‘sufferers’ include “(1) the
belief that the violence to the woman is her fault; (2) an inability to
place responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) a fear for her life
and the lives of her children; and (4) an irrational belief that the
abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.”14 In order to deal with the
constant violence, a battered woman often develops strong coping
mechanisms and a belief that by doing more she can stop the con-
stant violence.15 Ultimately, BWS is a psychological condition that can
lead “a female victim of physical abuse to accept her beatings because
she believes that she is responsible for them, and hopes that by ac-
cepting one more beating, the pattern will stop.”16
Typically, BWS follows a cycle of violence.17 As one author de-
scribes the cycle:
The battering relationship itself is often . . . cyclical in nature,
with three distinct phases: tension building, confrontation, and
contrition. During the ‘tension building’ phase, the woman is gener-
ally compliant, often feeling as though she deserves the abuse.
Once the tension reaches a boiling point, the batterer will erupt
uncontrollably, committing a violent act. Next, in an abrupt about-
face, the abuser will exhibit seemingly intense love and affection
towards his victim. The victimized women are then led to believe
that the violence was an isolated incident and that it will not con-
tinue. This cycle of violence may leave the victim with feelings of
learned helplessness, low self-esteem, depression, minimization
techniques, self-isolation, and passivity.18
13. Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1991).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1240.
17. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 583 (Cal. 2004).
18. Hawes, supra note 6, at 137 (footnotes omitted); see also Garcia, supra note 3, at
105–06.
224 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 20:221
This cycle of violence creates an environment analogous to other forms
of post-traumatic stress.19 Although cyclical in nature, there is no de-
fined amount of time required for moving through the cycles.20
The first stage of the cycle, the tension building phase, focuses on
the batterer asserting control.21 The batterer may assert control by
criticizing his partner’s behavior, calling her names, highlighting her
shortcomings or failures, and isolating his partner from family or
friends.22 Intimidation also forms a central part of the tension building
phase wherein the batterer may use direct threats of harm or indirect
threats of harm such as yelling, punching walls, or harming pets.23
Following the verbal abuse and intimidation, the batterer gains
control by expressing his love for his partner and shifting any blame
to her.24
In the second stage, the confrontation phase, the batterer displays
overt violence against his partner.25 Although this stage may begin
with relatively minor violence such as “shoving, slapping, hair-pulling,
or slamming the woman up against a wall,” the level of violence esca-
lates over time to include “kicks, punches with closed fists, actual
beatings, multiple blows, threats with knives and guns, rape, mutila-
tion, and even murder.” 26
Following the violence of the second stage, the final contrition
phase focuses on keeping the victim with the batterer.27 The batterer
becomes apologetic and professes his love, claiming the violent epi-
sode was a one-off outburst that will not happen again.28 He also may
try to blame the victim for the violence but nonetheless promises to
change, and in some cases may even volunteer to go to counseling.29
But, “[s]imultaneously, he [the batterer] reinforces feelings of in-
adequacy and love in the victim, as well as his power and control
over her.” 30
19. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (“[BWS] is considered a
sub-category of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, which is generally accepted and is listed
in the DSM-3R. Based upon our independent review of the available sources on the subject,
we believe that the syndrome is a mixture of both psychological and physiological symptoms
but is not a mental disease in the context of insanity.”). But see State v. Copeland, 928
S.W.2d 828, 838 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
20. WALKER, supra note 7, at 55.
21. Garcia, supra note 3, at 105–06 (footnotes omitted).
22. Id. at 106 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Garcia, supra note 3, at 106 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 106–07 (footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at 107 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id.
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To the layperson, remaining in such an obvious cycle of manipu-
lation and abuse may be confounding at the least and absurd at the
most.31 But the dynamics involved in the types of abusive relationships
that form the foundation of BWS are much more complex and are com-
monly outside a layperson’s understanding.32 Many women remain
with their abusive partners because of a perception that they are
doing what is best for themselves and their children.33 Strong fi-
nancial and emotional ties often weave the batterer and his victim
together.34 Breaking those ties or attempting to break those ties can
often lead to an increase in violence, regardless of what legal protec-
tions may exist.35 This “no-win situation” 36 can lead to behavior and
actions by victims that are simply outside of common understanding.
But the introduction of BWS testimony to inform and enhance a
layperson’s understanding is not always welcomed, both legally
and psychologically.37
II. THE EVIDENTIARY ISSUE
A. Relevance
Typically, the first hurdle in admitting any type of evidence is
relevancy. In People v. Humphrey, the California Supreme Court
31. See, e.g., Louise Kiernan, Complex Issues Trap Women in Abuse, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 16, 1993, at A1 (asking the rhetorical questions: “[w]hy didn’t she get help? Why
didn’t she kick him out? Why didn’t she leave? If she did leave, why would she ever agree
to see him again? Those on the outside see these as logical questions, the steps painfully
obvious: ‘If only she’d done this.’ ‘If only she’d done that.’ ”).
32. See, e.g., Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who
Fail to Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner’s Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
67, 86 (1995) (“The commonly held attitude of ‘I would have done . . . ’ fails to take into ac-
count . . . that the ‘I’ referred to is a vastly different ‘I’ than the one in the actual battering
situation. That is, those who say ‘I would have . . . ’ typically speak from their own non-
battered experience, beliefs, emotions, education, and socio-economic situation, rather than
from a battered woman’s point of view. Furthermore, inquiries blaming women are mis-
placed. More appropriate inquiries are: why did he batter?; could she have left him?; and
how could we have helped her to leave him? Leaving the abuser often does not stop the vio-
lence. Consider that three-fourths of women killed in domestic violence were separated or
divorced from their mate.”) (footnotes omitted); see also Kiernan, supra note 31.
33. See Kiernan, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. See id. (“[E]ven with the recent proliferation of anti-stalking laws and the increase
in women seeking protective orders, many tragedies attest that paper can’t stop bullets or
knives or fists . . . . So, in the absence of any absolute protection from violence, there can
be a perverse sense of safety and logic in staying.”).
36. Id. (quoting Lenore Walker).
37. See, e.g., Shana Wallace, Note, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and
Battered Women’s Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2004) (“[S]ome femi-
nist scholars criticize BWS both for diagnosing battered women who act in their own defense
as mentally ill and for ignoring the actual obstacles they face, while more conservative crit-
ics argue that BWS is a special standard for women that cloaks ulterior motives.”).
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admitted expert testimony on BWS.38 The court held BWS testimony
was relevant to the question of whether the victim acted reasonably
and to the victim’s credibility.39 The majority of courts, however, re-
quire the proponent of expert testimony of BWS to establish “some
evidentiary foundation that a party or witness to the case is a battered
woman, and that party or witness has behaved in such a manner that
the jury would be aided by expert testimony providing an explanation
for the behavior.” 40 Without such a showing, BWS testimony is irrele-
vant and thus inadmissible.41 But with such a showing, prior physical
assaults may be relevant to a defendant’s fear if she resisted her hus-
band or the aggressor.42
The relevance of expert testimony of BWS also often requires the
showing of a “critical link.” 43 The party seeking to admit expert testi-
mony of BWS must establish a critical link between the expert’s tes-
timony about BWS generally and the specific complainant suffering
from BWS.44 But showing a “critical link” can put the proverbial cart
before the horse. If the issue in a given case is whether the witness
or defendant suffered from BWS, requiring a separate evidentiary
showing for BWS can deprive the jury of their role as the trier of fact.
In essence, the jury is asked to decide the ultimate issue in the case
before hearing all of the testimony.
B. Character Evidence
Courts have held the use of expert testimony on BWS inadmissi-
ble for bolstering a witness’s or defendant’s credibility.45 Instead, the
testimony has been held admissible for explaining the witness’s or
defendant’s behavior.46 At times, a witness’s or defendant’s behavior
38. See People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1992).
39. Id.
40. People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 585 (Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1243. (8th Cir. 1991) (“Evidence
that Arcoren hit her with a baseball bat a year before was relevant to that issue, since it
suggested that any apparent consent by Brave Bird might have resulted from fear of bodily
injury if she resisted.”).
43. See Brown, 95 P.3d at 586.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“[E]x-
pert testimony regarding a ‘battered person syndrome’ was relevant to the appellant’s state
of mind and is not introduced to improperly bolster the credibility of the defendant, but
rather, to aid the jury in evaluating the defendant’s behavior and state of mind given the
abusive environment which existed.”).
46. Id.
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can appear strange or counter-intuitive, as was the case in Arcoren.47
In such instances, expert testimony on BWS was admitted but only
on the narrower issue of explaining behavior rather than bolstering
credibility.48
C. Expert Witnesses
The use of expert testimony on BWS, especially in cases involving
affirmative self-defense claims, has increased in recent years.49 Often,
expert testimony on BWS is admissible under analogous rules to
Federal Rule of Evidence 70250 because it is scientific and technical.51
Courts, however, often prohibit experts from testifying to the ultimate
issue, namely whether the witness or defendant has BWS because
“[t]his determination must be left to the trier of fact.” 52 But the testi-
mony may still be admissible to the extent that it is beyond the under-
standing of the average person.53 A majority of states have accepted
this argument for the admissibility of expert testimony on BWS.54
III. RULES OF EVIDENCE ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BWS
A. Evidentiary Developments in California
In 2005, California adopted a categorical acceptance of “intimate
partner battering” in California Evidence Code § 1107.55 Arguably this
47. In Arcoren, the witness did an ‘about-face’ in her testimony during trial, stating that
the man who assaulted her was actually not the man she had previously indicated in her
deposition. The court ultimately permitted BWS testimony to assist the jury, stating that
[a] jury naturally would be puzzled at the complete about-face she made, and
would have great difficulty in determining which version of Brave Bird’s tes-
timony it should believe. If there were some explanation for Brave Bird’s
changed statements, such explanation would aid the jury in deciding which
statements were credible.
Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1991).
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1239; People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1992);
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Miller, 634 A.2d at 619.
50. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on suf-
ficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”).
51. See, e.g., Arcoren, 929 F.2d at 1239.
52. Id. (citation omitted).
53. See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989).
54. Id.
55. In relevant part, § 1107 states:
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the prose-
cution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its effects,
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evidentiary rule eliminates barriers to admission of BWS testimony.
Practically, the rule may change little, as it was intended only as a
rule of evidence rather than a substantive addition.56 By creating an
evidentiary rule, however, California legitimized a common law,
“backdoor” solution for such testimony. By admitting the evidence
under an evidentiary rule, California may have eliminated some of the
stigma and issues surrounding BWS, which is important independent
of the practical effects of the legislation.
Interestingly, though, California courts have not always relied on
a special evidentiary rule for admitting BWS testimony even following
the passage of § 1107.57 In People v. Brown, the California Supreme
Court held BWS testimony in a domestic violence case admissible
under California Evidence Code § 801 rather than California’s special-
ized Evidence Code § 1107.58 It found BWS testimony “assist[s] the
trier of fact in evaluating the credibility of the victim’s [inconsistent
statements] . . . by providing relevant information about the tendency
of victims of domestic violence later to recant or minimize their de-
scription of the violence.” 59
Prior to and even after the enactment of § 1107, California courts
have used § 801 to admit BWS testimony.60 To fit within § 801,61
courts permitted BWS testimony in order to disabuse the trier of fact
of misconceptions relating to a victim’s usual behavior following an
assault.62 BWS testimony was also permitted to “explain how the
victim’s experiences as a battered woman affected her perceptions of
danger, its imminence, and what actions were necessary to protect
including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the
beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence, except when
offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts
of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge;
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony
if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qual-
ifications of the expert witness. Expert opinion testimony on intimate partner
battering and its effects shall not be considered a new scientific technique
whose reliability is unproven.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2013).
56. See People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 17 (Cal. 1992) (Brown, J., concurring)
(“Evidence Code section 1107 is a ‘rule of evidence only;’ ‘no substantive change affecting
the Penal Code is intended.’ ”) (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 583 (Cal. 2004).
58. Id. at 575.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 580–81.
61. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 2013) (“(a) [Testimony] [r]elated to a subject that
is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact”).
62. See Brown, 94 P.3d at 580.
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herself.” 63 Not all California courts permitted BWS testimony, how-
ever, even under § 801 and judicial precedent.64
There is a tension between § 801 and § 1107.65 Evidence Code
§ 1107 refers specifically to BWS, which “pertains to women who have
been subjected to an extended period of abuse.” 66 But § 1107 also per-
mits expert testimony on the effects of domestic violence on a victim’s
perceptions, beliefs, and behavior.67 Under this second category, there
is no requirement for a pattern of abuse; one domestic assault is suf-
ficient. The California Supreme Court did not resolve the tension
within § 1107 in Brown.68
By fitting the testimony at issue under § 801(a), however, the
court seems to presume that BWS will remain “beyond common ex-
perience.” This poses a dilemma—greater recognition of BWS within
society could render § 801(a) inapplicable as a basis for admitting ex-
pert testimony. Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court remains
unclear as to how much prior abuse is necessary for expert testimony
to be admissible under § 1107. This ambiguity leaves the potential for
a batterer to get “one free episode of domestic violence before admis-
sion of evidence.” 69
B. Evidentiary Developments in Ohio
BWS first appeared in Ohio courts in 1981 in State v. Thomas.70
The court rejected BWS testimony because the testimony was “irrel-
evant and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant acted in
self-defense.” 71 The court also held that the subject matter of the tes-
timony was within the understanding of the jury; BWS was not a
sufficiently developed scientific theory to be considered “expert” testi-
mony, and the probative value of the testimony did not outweigh its
prejudicial impact.72 In 1990, however, the holding in State v. Koss
overruled Thomas.73 Importantly in Koss, the court acknowledged that
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 581–82.
66. Id. at 581.
67. Id.
68. Brown, 94 P.3d at 581–82 (noting that although there’s a “conundrum” in § 1107,
there was no need to resolve the issue in the instant case because of the applicability of
§ 801(a)).
69. Brown, 94 P.3d at 581.
70. See State v. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ohio 1981); Hawes, supra note 6, at
137–38.
71. Thomas, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
72. Hawes, supra note 6, at 138–39 (citations omitted).
73. State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990).
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expert testimony on BWS would help the jury’s understanding and
address the reasonableness of a woman’s fear of imminent danger.74
At the same time Koss was under consideration, the Ohio leg-
islature considered Ohio Revised Code § 2901.06, which addressed
the use of expert testimony on BWS.75 Code § 2901.06 specifically
addressed the findings in Thomas by concluding that BWS is an ac-
cepted syndrome in the scientific community,76 and it is not within
the common understanding of jurors.77 Subsection (B) of § 2901.06
addressed the use of BWS in self-defense claims and is worth stating
in full:
If a person is charged with an offense involving the use of force
against another and the person, as a defense to the offense
charged, raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, the person
may introduce expert testimony of the ‘battered woman syndrome’
and expert testimony that the person suffered from that syndrome
as evidence to establish the requisite belief of an imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of
the affirmative defense, to justify the person’s use of the force in
question. The introduction of any expert testimony under this divi-
sion shall be in accordance with the Ohio Rules of Evidence.78
In subsequent cases, though, courts have read § 2901.06(B) as a limi-
tation on the use of BWS testimony.79
In State v. Pargeon, the court relied on § 2901.06(B) to find expert
testimony on BWS inadmissible in domestic violence cases because
the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by unfair preju-
dice in violation of Ohio Rules of Evidence.80 The court also held that
the testimony violated Ohio Rules of Evidence because the testimony
was really about prior bad acts “from which the inference may be
drawn that [the defendant] has the propensity to beat his wife” and
that he did so on this particular occasion.81 But ultimately the court
found that Koss and § 2901.06(B) limited the application of § 2901.06,
74. Id. at 973.
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (West 2013).
76. See id. § 2901.06(A)(1) (“That . . . [battered woman] syndrome currently is a matter
of commonly accepted scientific knowledge.”).
77. See id. § 2901.06(A)(2) (“That the subject matter and details of the syndrome are not
within the general understanding or experience of a person who is a member of the general
populace and are not within the field of common knowledge.”).
78. See id. § 2901.06(B).
79. See, e.g., State v. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ohio 1991). But see State v.
Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ohio 2006) (holding expert testimony is admissible “in the
state’s case-in-chief to help a jury understand a victim’s reaction to abuse in relation to
her credibility.”).
80. Hawes, supra note 6, at 142.
81. Pargeon, 582 N.E.2d at 666.
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and expert testimony on BWS generally, to only cases where BWS is
raised as part of an affirmative self-defense claim.82
In 2006, in State v. Haines, the Ohio Supreme Court directly ad-
dressed the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony on BWS in
domestic violence cases and concluded the testimony was admissible.83
The court relied heavily on its earlier holding in Koss, especially the
value of expert testimony on BWS in dispelling misconceptions about
a woman’s behavior in the face of domestic violence.84 Taken together,
Koss and § 2901.06 do not limit the use of expert testimony on BWS to
self-defense following Haines.85 The court acknowledged, however, that
although there is no limitation on the use of BWS testimony to self-
defense cases, the testimony must still be admissible under other Ohio
Rules of Evidence.86
Relevance is the first issue when assessing the admissibility of
expert testimony on BWS.87 The court found instructive that “battered
woman syndrome testimony is relevant and helpful when needed
to explain a complainant’s actions, such as prolonged endurance of
physical abuse accompanied by attempts at hiding or minimizing
the abuse, delays in reporting the abuse, or recanting allegations of
abuse.” 88 Thus, the court held that appropriate foundation must be
laid for establishing that the particular defendant or witness suffers
from BWS but there are no rigid foundational requirements.89 In-
stead, establishing the general cycle of violence associated with BWS
is sufficient.90
C. Evidentiary Developments in Missouri
In 1987, the Missouri General Assembly passed § 563.0333 ad-
dressing “battered spouse syndrome” in self-defense claims.91 Section
563.0333 states in relevant part:
1. Evidence that the actor was suffering from the battered spouse
syndrome shall be admissible upon the issue of whether the actor
lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another.
82. Id.
83. State v. Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 97 (Ohio 2006).
84. Id. at 98.
85. See id. at 99.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Haines, 860 N.E.2d at 99–100 (citing People v. Christel, 537 N.W.2d 194
(Mich. 1995)).
89. See id. at 100.
90. See id. (establishing a general cycle of violence is one possible way of addressing the
“critical link” issue); see supra text accompanying notes 43–44.
91. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West 2013). Although Missouri uses the term “battered
spouse syndrome,” for purposes of consistency, this Note will continue to use “BWS” when
referencing Missouri’s statute.
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2. If the defendant proposes to offer evidence of the battered spouse
syndrome, he shall file written notice thereof with the court in ad-
vance of trial. Thereafter, the court, upon motion of the state, shall
appoint one or more private psychiatrists or psychologists . . . to
examine the accused . . . . No private psychiatrist, psychologist, or
physician shall be appointed by the court unless he has consented
to act. The examinations ordered shall be made at such time and
place and under such conditions as the court deems proper . . . .
The order may include provisions for the interview of witnesses.
3. No statement made by the accused in the course of any such ex-
amination and no information received by any physician or other
person in the course thereof, whether such examination was made
with or without the consent of the accused or upon his motion or
upon that of others, shall be admitted in evidence against the
accused on the issue of whether he committed the act charged
against him in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter pend-
ing in any court, state or federal.92
Section 563.033 has been interpreted to apply equally to women
married to the batterer and those “merely in a relationship with
him.” 93 It has also been limited to claims of self-defense rather than as
part of an independent defense.94
The case of State v. Edwards presents an interesting fact pattern
and helps clarify Missouri’s understanding of BWS. Mrs. Edwards and
her husband had been arguing throughout the day but the argument
escalated when they arrived at their shared place of employment.95
Mr. Edwards struck Mrs. Edwards in the arm with a lead pipe.96 Mrs.
Edwards retreated and picked up a .38 caliber pistol and shot her
husband four times, striking him in the head, arm, and back.97 At
trial, Mrs. Edwards stated, “I knew one of us was not going to walk
out of that store.” 98
92. Id.
93. State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001).
94. See State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 838 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). In Copeland, the
court stated that
[the Missouri General Assembly] has authorized the defense of battered
spouse syndrome in matters of self-defense [in § 563.033]. Had the legislature
intended battered spouse syndrome to be a general defense, it could easily
have made provision for that defense. If self-defense is not in the case, there
is no authority for admitting such evidence unless in support of a claim of
mental disease or defect.
Id.
95. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d at 606.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 607.
98. Id. at 606.
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For several years prior to the shooting, Mrs. Edwards had seen
Dr. Gerald Roderick for stress anxiety.99 At trial, Dr. Roderick testified
that whenever he would suggest Mrs. Edwards leave her husband,
Mrs. Edwards would respond that if she did so, Mr. Edwards would
kill her.100 The deposition of another doctor was read into the record
at trial and stated that in the expert’s opinion, Mrs. Edwards believed
she was in imminent danger at the time of the shooting.101
In addressing Mrs. Edwards’s contentions on appeal, the court
stated that “while evidence of the battered spouse syndrome is not in
and of itself a defense to a murder charge, its function is to aid the
jury in determining whether a defendant’s fear and claim of self-
defense are reasonable.”102 Furthermore, the court found that BWS
is beyond the understanding of an average juror.103 Indeed, the court
believed that it is difficult for a layperson to understand the actions of
a battered woman.104
The legal difficulty, however, is identifying the proper lens
through which to view the battered woman’s actions. At times, Mis-
souri courts have held that “the evidence is to be weighed by the jury
in light of how the reasonable battered woman would have perceived
and reacted in view of the prolonged history of physical abuse.”105
More recently, though, Missouri courts have found that standard to
create an oxymoron.106 Instead, they have stated the accurate descrip-
tion of the law is “if the jury believes the defendant was suffering from
battered spouse syndrome, it must weigh the evidence in light of how
an otherwise reasonable person who is suffering from battered spouse
syndrome would have perceived and reacted in view of the prolonged
history of physical abuse.”107 Although the newer standard clarifies
the oddity of using a “reasonable battered woman” standard when the
whole purpose of BWS is to identify a completely different mindset
and set of perceptions, the “otherwise reasonable BWS sufferer” seems
equally susceptible to being called an “oxymoron.”108
99. Id. at 607.
100. Id.
101. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d at 607.
102. Id. at 613.
103. Id.
104. Id. (“It is difficult for a lay person to understand why a battered spouse does not es-
cape the situation or notify the police. A lay person may perceive that a battered woman
is free to leave the spouse at any time. Indeed, a juror may otherwise conclude by ‘common
sense’ that if the abuse were so bad the woman would have left the relationship.”) (cita-
tions omitted).
105. State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 312–13 (1990).
106. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d at 614.
107. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
108. Accepting the court’s statement in Edwards that “[a] battered woman is a terror-
stricken person whose mental state is distorted,” it is unclear what exactly the court’s
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D. Domestic Violence
Domestic violence differs from other forms of criminal violence.109
Compared to other types of crimes, domestic violence is often signif-
icantly underreported.110 Typically those charged, the batterers, are
male, and the victims are female.111 Prosecutors also face atypical dif-
ficulties in prosecuting domestic violence cases because victims may
recant earlier statements or simply refuse to testify.112 This type of
violence is also different in that “family violence occurs within ongo-
ing relationships that are expected to be protective, supportive, and
nurturing.”113 Lastly, prosecutors of domestic violence cases face
unique difficulties in prosecuting batterers because of the close ties
between batterer and victim.114
Domestic violence cases, though, may provide analogous clues
about the challenges of establishing a sufficient foundation for expert
testimony on BWS in cases where “only” a single incident of violence
has occurred. In a domestic violence charge, the issue before the court
is precisely whether domestic violence has occurred. Thus, the concern
is that admitting expert testimony on BWS preemptively answers the
question before the jury—whether domestic violence has occurred.115
Therefore, there must be an independent showing of evidence “from
“more accurate” standard actually means. Id. One interpretation could be that a battered
woman is an otherwise reasonable person who, during the violence, acted in an “unreason-
able” way if viewed outside the lens of BWS. This interpretation avoids labeling a BWS
sufferer as someone with a mental disease that pre-exists the incident. See supra note 37
and accompanying text. Yet, conceptually, part of the point of BWS is to acknowledge that
a battered woman thinks within a different paradigm altogether from other people. Putting
an “otherwise reasonable person” qualifier thus runs the risk of eliminating the benefit of
BWS testimony aimed at identifying the different perceptions held by battered women.
109. See People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 577 (Cal. 2004).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Hawes, supra note 6, at 134.
113. Brown, 94 P.3d at 577.
114. See id. at 582. (“The Legislature, courts, and legal commentators have noted the
close analogy between use of expert testimony to explain the behavior of domestic violence
victims, and expert testimony concerning victims of rape or child abuse.”).
115. Id. at 584. Defense counsel (for the batterer) raised the objection that the argument
in favor of admitting expert testimony after a single incident of violence was circular. Id.
at 583. Defense counsel argued that the jury must first determine guilt in the underlying
charge of domestic violence in order for there to be a sufficient foundation to admit the
expert testimony. Id. at 583–84. The court ultimately rejected this view, however, based
simply on precedent. Id. at 584. Although the Court was somewhat dismissive of this ob-
jection, there is at least some persuasive force to the circularity argument. Expert testi-
mony of BWS in a case of a single or first incident does appear to be dependent on the truth
of the underlying charge for purposes of establishing a sufficient foundation. Admitting
such evidence prior to a jury determination arguably usurps the jury’s role. For additional
discussion of this issue in California courts, see id. at 581.
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which the trier of fact could find the charges true,”116 in order to admit
expert testimony on domestic violence. But for the court in Brown,
when dealing with credibility, that did not mean there was a require-
ment for a preliminary finding that the charged act occurred before
the jury could consider the expert testimony.117 The expert testimony
is admissible provided there is an independent showing that the wit-
ness or defendant suffered from BWS.118
E. Rape Shield Statutes
Rape shield statutes119 present a potential analytical corollary to
expert testimony on BWS.120 Rape shield statutes represent a legisla-
tive balance between the interests of the public and the victim weighed
against the defendant’s right to testify.121 They represent legislative
determinations about a victim’s right to privacy.122 Similar rights
could be recognized for witnesses or defendants in BWS cases. Admit-
tedly, the potential “status” as a witness versus a defendant is differ-
ent than that of a typical victim in rape cases. Yet, much of the focus
of BWS testimony, and indeed some of the harshest criticism against
BWS testimony, stems from the victimization of the woman regardless
of whether she is a witness or a defendant.123
Evidentiary rules such as California’s § 1107, Ohio’s § 2901.06,
or Missouri’s § 563.033 could be seen as analogous legislative deter-
minations to rape shield statutes. Both reflect a balancing of whether
“the interests served by the rule justify the limitation,” or in the
case of BWS, expansion of admissible evidence. Certainly a perva-
sive risk of BWS testimony, whether by an expert witness or prior
bad acts, is undue prejudice. The legislative determination is to
what extent prejudice is permissible in the interest of furthering a
116. People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 584 (Cal. 2004).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412.
120. See, e.g., Brown, 94 P.3d at 582. But see id. at 587 (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing
that rape cases are primarily distinct from cases of domestic violence because misconcep-
tions in rape cases are more likely to arise from a single incident. Misconceptions related
to BWS, instead, stem from a woman remaining in a relationship despite continued abuse
when she could leave the relationship. Similarly, domestic violence cases are distinct from
rape cases in that domestic violence cases rely on the relationship between the victim and
the defendant whereas rape cases do not).
121. See Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir.1994) (holding statutes like rape
shield statutes are “required to evaluate whether the interests served by the rule justify the
limitation imposed on the criminal defendant’s right to testify.”).
122. Id. (stating that rape shield statutes “represent the valid legislative determination
that victims of rape and . . . attempted rape deserve heightened protection against surprise,
harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.”).
123. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 37, at 1749.
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defendant’s robust self-defense claim or the prosecution of legitimate
acts of domestic violence.
IV. SOLUTIONS AND LOOKING FORWARD
A. International Approaches to Self-Defense
One possible alternative approach to restructuring evidentiary
principles in favor of admitting expert testimony on BWS, advocated
by Shana Wallace, is to apply international norms on “imminence” to
individual self-defense claims.124 Doing so would “identify the elements
that are already implicitly assessed by ‘imminence’ and assign them
their appropriate legal weight—rather than leaving it to the unar-
ticulated prejudices of judges and juries.”125 By explicitly identifying
the elements, a court might avoid misconceptions about BWS, which
can form the evidentiary predicate for admitting expert testimony
on BWS.126
Minimizing or eliminating misconceptions is only part of the force
of Wallace’s argument for applying international norms on imminence
to individual self-defense claims. Under this approach, properly iden-
tifying the elements of imminence cloaks the actions of a battered
woman in a “legally recognized experience, rather than as [a] mental
illness.”127 Although perhaps intangible, there certainly would seem
to be a value in reducing the stigmatization of being labeled with a
“syndrome” or illness as the result of raising a legal self-defense
claim.128 Practically, whether BWS is cloaked in a “legal experience”
or mental syndrome, the misconceptions are likely to remain regard-
less of the terminology. That is not to say, though, that the elimina-
tion of “syndrome” from the nomenclature could shift the baseline
of misconceptions from an “illness” to a legal creation.
Properly identifying the elements of self-defense in battered
women’s cases would also address criticisms raised by both feminists
124. See, e.g., id. at 1750–51 (“Historically, self-defense in the international context
has developed through analogy and reference to an individual’s right of self-defense.
Currently the standards for self-defense are the same for individuals as for international
entities: the danger must be imminent, and the self-defensive force both necessary and
proportional. In both contexts, a strict requirement that a threat be temporally ‘imminent’
renders illegal any action taken in preemptive, or anticipatory, self-defense. With the Bush
administration’s adoption of a new policy of preemptive self-defense, the three factors
(beyond temporality) that have been articulated as defining imminence are probability,
availability of alternative recourses, and magnitude of harm. In keeping with the tradi-
tionally analogous relationship between the international and domestic concepts, these
factors should be relevant to individual self-defense as well.”) (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 1751.
126. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 584 (Cal. 2004).
127. Wallace, supra note 37, at 1751.
128. See discussion supra note 8.
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and legal conservatives.129 “[B]y replacing an amorphous syndrome
with more accessible, and objective, factors,”130 international norms
on imminence “may enable a greater number of battered women who
kill their abusers to receive self-defense jury instructions and have
their actions deemed justifiable self-defense.”131 Although Wallace as-
sumes the conclusion, namely that allowing more women to raise a
self-defense claim is a good thing, her approach would permit the trier
of fact to determine the credibility of a self-defense claim rather than
the judge in an evidentiary hearing.
Despite the issues with current conceptions of BWS, Wallace
believes BWS has solved the evidentiary and jury instruction prob-
lems.132 As Wallace accurately acknowledges, however, a finding that
a defendant suffers from BWS does not equal a battered woman’s
defense.133 Instead, the introduction of BWS testimony simply permits
the jury to receive jury instructions on self-defense.134 Practically,
though, this is all that an evidentiary rule can accomplish. By permit-
ting evidence to go before the trier of fact, all that can be assured is
that the defense is raised, not that it is accepted. There is no assur-
ance, however, that a proper identification of the elements of immi-
nence would produce any result different from an evidentiary rule.135
Ultimately Wallace’s proposal for reconsidering the elements of
self-defense based on international norms is intriguing and perhaps
more robust than an evidentiary rule. Although Wallace acknowledges
the institutional resistance to changing the traditional requirements
of self-defense,136 she may underplay its practical consequences.
Changing evidentiary rules presents an alternative, middle ground
approach to expanding the scope of admissible evidence without chal-
lenging the traditional requirements of self-defense.
129. See Wallace, supra note 37, at 1779 (noting a concern that the “relaxed require-
ments (proposed) for self-defense . . . would tend to categorically legalize the opportune
killing of abusive husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives’ testimony con-
cerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future felonious assaults by
their husbands. Homicidal self-help would then become a lawful solution, and perhaps the
easiest and most effective solution, to this problem.”) (citing State v. Norman, 378 N.E.2d
8, 15 (N.C. 1989)).
130. Id. at 1751.
131. Id. Presumably the same considerations could apply to the use of BWS testimony
in domestic violence cases.
132. Id. at 1756.
133. Id. at 1756, n.39 (citations omitted).
134. Id.
135. Wallace may believe that her approach has more persuasive force with jurors, but
there is no assurance that a jury, properly presented with the elements of imminence, will
arrive at the conclusion that the battered woman acted in self-defense.
136. See Wallace, supra note 37, at 1780. Wallace acknowledges that “[t]he legal system
has steadfastly refused to reconsider the traditional requirements of self-defense,” and yet
nonetheless appears to attempt to reconsider the traditional requirements.
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B. Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence
Today, forty-two states, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
and the U.S. Military have adopted rules of evidence based on the
Federal Rules of Evidence.137 Most of these jurisdictions adopted rules
similar to the 1975 Congressional enactment,138 and some jurisdictions
based their rules on earlier versions.139 Meanwhile, “[a]s the Federal
Rules of Evidence have been amended, some jurisdictions with rules
based on the Federal Rules have also promptly amended theirs to in-
corporate the new addition[s] . . . [while] [o]thers have followed the
federal lead less promptly, and still others have only rarely incorpo-
rated [federal changes].”140
Regardless of the particular degree, the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence had a profound impact on state evidence rules.141
The Federal Rules of Evidence were not, however, universally well-
received.142 Regardless of the Federal Rules of Evidence’s reception,
though, the argument for conformity at the state level can be summed
up in a word: uniformity.143
137. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1
(2d ed. 2012) (Table of State and Military Adaptations of Federal Rules of Evidence).
138. Id.
139. Id. (“Other jurisdictions patterned their rules more closely on the Rules as the
Supreme Court promulgated them in 1972. Still others adopted rules more closely resem-
bling the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence, which were largely based on the 1972 final draft
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as modified and approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and subsequently approved by the American
Bar Association.”).
140. Id.
141. See Leonard Packel, Introduction, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (1985).
142. At least some commentators believe the Federal Rules of Evidence were not a good
codification because:
First, the Federal Rules are poorly drafted—probably because of the haste
with which they were put together rather than any lack of skill on the part of
the drafters. Second, the Federal Rules do not accomplish what every writer,
with the possible exception of Wigmore, has thought was essential: the
Federal Rules do nothing to simplify evidence law. Finally, the Federal Rules
continue a hundred-year-old trend of centering in trial judges more discre-
tionary power to influence the outcome of litigation, thus reducing the role of
lawyers in litigation.
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43
OKLA. L. REV. 293, 294, n.7 (1990).
143. See id. at 295. Graham presents several political and policy reasons for uniformity.
From a political perspective, Graham argues that uniformity could be the product of lobby-
ing by national law schools who wanted to prevent having to teach evidence law from fifty
different jurisdictions, lawyers that practice in both federal and state courts, traveling
lawyers that practice in multiple states, and corporate lawyers. See id. at 296–97. From
a policy standpoint, Graham argues that uniformity facilitates the fairness, efficiency, and
progress codified in FRE 102, reduces the cost of legal services by making it easier to
practice across state lines, and tremendous economies of scale by having judges, lawyers,
and scholars apply the same set of evidentiary rules. See id. at 299–300.
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Leveraging the force of uniformity may be the best way forward
because otherwise “the law of evidence is highly decentralized, bring-
ing about the desired change [to the rules of evidence] would require
a political effort in each of the fifty states as well as in the national
capital.”144 Thus, a continued disintegrated approach to BWS testi-
mony reform on the state level would require a political effort in each
state, which may exceed the contemporary political will. Instead, by
approaching the issue on a national level through the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the desire for uniformity could lead states “to adopt sub-
sequent changes in the Federal Rules that they would reject if the
change were debated solely on its merits. In short, for political pur-
poses the appearance of uniformity is almost as potent as the fact.”145
The desire for uniformity could thus encourage states to make changes
to their rules of evidence to remain in line with changes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence at a lower political cost than if changes
were attempted on a state-by-state basis.
Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to include a special al-
lowance for BWS testimony similar to either California’s,146 Ohio’s,147
or Missouri’s148 may present a more efficient and less costly option for
reform. Although Wallace seeks to reconsider the traditional elements
of self-defense rather than evidentiary changes,149 her approach may
simply be too “radical” for mainstream acceptance.150 Amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence with the goal of gaining broader state-level
acceptance may provide a more feasible and acceptable middle ground.
But changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence, or any codification
approach for that matter, present their own challenges. “Any uniform
law of evidence, it is argued, will of necessity be a law of consensus
and of the least common denominator among the affected inter-
ests,”151 whether dealing with expert testimony on BWS or a more
mundane evidentiary principle. If that is true, a change to the Federal
Rules of Evidence may fall far short of protecting the interests of
women.152 Wallace may then be right that “the best that has been done
to include women’s experiences in the law of self-defense has been to
144. Id. at 297.
145. Id. at 298–99.
146. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2013).
147. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (West 2013).
148. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West 2013).
149. See discussion supra note 124.
150. See Wallace, supra note 37, at 1780 (“The legal system has steadfastly refused to
reconsider the traditional requirements of self-defense.”).
151. Graham, supra note 142, at 301.
152. See, e.g., discussion supra Parts III.A–C (noting the judicial ambiguity in applying
BWS evidentiary rules designed for self-defense claims for defendants to witnesses who
recant their testimony at trial in domestic violence cases).
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offer the potential inclusion of evidence that their actions can be ex-
plained by a syndrome.”153 Whatever issues may surround the use of
“syndrome” in BWS, arguably its use is better than no inclusion of the
testimony at all or a failed attempt to redefine the traditional ele-
ments of self-defense.
C. Creating a ‘Model’ Rule for the Federal Rules of Evidence
Accepting that amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is the
proper way to proceed, the inevitable question becomes, what would
the rule look like? Although perhaps a fool’s errand to seek to answer
such a question, the lessons from California, Ohio, and Missouri may
provide some guidance. Melding the three statutes into one could pro-
duce the following “model rule”154 for the Federal Rules of Evidence:
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either
the prosecution or the defense regarding Battered Women’s
Syndrome (BWS) and its effects, including the nature and effect
of physical, emotional, or mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions,
or behavior of victims of domestic violence, except when offered
against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or
acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge. If the
evidence is being offered by a defendant charged with an offense
involving the use of force against another and the defendant
raises the affirmative defense of self-defense, the defendant may
introduce expert testimony that the defendant suffered from BWS
as evidence to establish the requisite belief of imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm that is necessary, as an element of
the affirmative defense, to justify the defendant’s use of the force
in question.
(b) Expert testimony regarding BWS and its effects is presump-
tively relevant in domestic violence cases or when a criminal defen-
dant raises the affirmative defense of self-defense. An opposing
party may attempt to rebut this presumption with a showing that
the testimony is irrelevant or extreme prejudice outweighs its pro-
bative value.
(c) The proponent of the evidence must establish the proper quali-
fications of the expert witness. No statement made by the defen-
dant in the course of any examination by an expert witness shall
be admitted in evidence against the defendant on the issue of
whether the defendant committed the act charged against him or
her in any criminal proceeding then or thereafter pending in any
153. See Wallace, supra note 37, at 1780.
154. In no way is the use of “model rule” intended to connote the expertise behind the
Model Penal Code, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or similar collaborative creations.
Instead, it is simply an attempt to layout a template for proceeding with a Federal Rule of
Evidence on expert testimony on BWS.
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court, state or federal. Expert opinion testimony on BWS and its
effects shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose
reliability is unproven.
(d) Despite its name, expert testimony on BWS shall be applicable
to any intimate partner battering. The issue of whether the rela-
tionship was sufficiently intimate or provided sufficient time to
establish a cycle of violence shall be an issue left for resolution by
the trier of fact after hearing the expert testimony.
Although by no means a perfect combination of the three statutes,
and certainly not a brief combination, the above model rule combines
some of the most important elements of each of three statutes.
Unpacking subsection (a) reveals essentially a strict combi-
nation of California’s statute,155 focused on domestic violence, and
Ohio’s statute,156 focused on the affirmative defense of self-defense.
“Imminence” is undefined in the model statute, but there is no rea-
son that the ultimate definition or interpretation could not incorpo-
rate Wallace’s definition of imminence.157 Subsection (a) still suffers
from the potential circularity argument regarding proving the ulti-
mate issue.158 The resolution of this potential issue, though, will likely
have to be left up to the courts.
Subsection (b) can trace its roots to California’s § 1107 (b). How-
ever, the language is arguably quite different. Rather than stating,
“[t]he foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this [BWS] expert
testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy
and the proper qualifications of the expert witness,”159 the model rule
states that expert testimony on BWS is presumptively relevant in both
cases discussed in (a).
As the model rule goes on to say in subsection (b), “[a]n opposing
party may attempt to rebut this presumption with a showing that the
testimony is irrelevant.” The language of the model rule is thus clearly
weighted in favor of admission. By shifting the burden to the opposing
party to show irrelevance, the model rule further advances a prefer-
ence for the inclusion of expert testimony on BWS but without elimi-
nating the possibility of excluding expert testimony on BWS in cases
where it is truly irrelevant. The model rule provides an additional op-
portunity for excluding expert testimony—through a showing of ex-
treme prejudice. Here again, there is a possibility of exclusion but the
rule remains clearly weighted in favor of admission.
155. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2013).
156. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.06 (West 2013).
157. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
158. See discussion supra note 115.
159. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2013).
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Turning to subsection (c), this section incorporates the protections
of Missouri’s subsection (3)160 on use of the defendant’s statements dur-
ing examination by the expert. The model rule also incorporates the
statement from California’s subsection (b)161 on the acceptability of
BWS in the scientific community, which prevents any potential at-
tacks to the psychological or psychiatric acceptance of BWS.
Finally, subsection (d) attempts to address the likely reality that
the cycle of violence that characterizes BWS is not limited to female
sufferers or heterosexual relationships. The California code implicitly
recognizes this fact with its use of “intimate partner battering” as the
descriptive phrase instead of BWS.162 Subsection (d) is also intended
to acknowledge that it is the cycle of violence that characterizes BWS
rather than a mental illness.163 Lastly, subsection (d) seeks to make
clear that the ultimate decision about the explanative power of BWS
is a question for the trier of fact rather than the judge as an eviden-
tiary matter. That is not to say, however, that judges do not and would
not find expert testimony on BWS beneficial to jurors.164
CONCLUSION
The violent and abusive acts too many women face at the hands
of their domestic partners is real and prevalent. When those violent
acts make their way to the courtroom, a new type of legal challenge
arises for many women: telling their stories in a legally admissible
way. Because of the limitations imposed on the scope of testimony
through rules of evidence, a thorough and complete story may not
always be possible. In some instances, such as with a victim’s past
sexual relationships,165 limiting the scope of a witness’s or victim’s
testimony may indeed be desirable. In other instances, though, elim-
inating all limitations on the scope of permissible evidence may
be desirable.166
When it comes to BWS, an underlying assumption throughout
this Note has been that permitting BWS testimony at trial is not only
desirable but also right. As is the case in California, Ohio, and Mis-
souri, one means of permitting increased BWS testimony at trial is
160. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (West 2013).
161. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 2013).
162. Id.
163. Whether this would appease the critics of the term “battered women’s syndrome”
is another question and likely one not soon to be resolved. See discussion supra note 8.
164. This is especially true considering “[t]hat the subject matter and details of the syn-
drome are not within the general understanding or experience of a person who is a member
of the general populace and are not within the field of common knowledge.” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2901.06(A)(2) (West 2013).
165. See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.E.
166. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (requiring a court to admit evidence of a criminal
conviction when the elements required proving a dishonest act or false statement).
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through reforming state rules of evidence.167 An alternative option can
be found in Wallace’s argument for redefining the traditional elements
of self-defense.168 A final option, and the position of this Note, is to
reform the Federal Rules of Evidence with the goal that evidentiary
changes at the federal level will be incorporated at the state level.
While no one option presents a single, proverbial silver bullet,
amending the Federal Rules of Evidence presents the best option.
California, Ohio, and Missouri represent viable, state-based options
for reform. But as earlier discussion illustrates, they are not without
their challenges in application.169 Furthermore, the slow, state-by-state
approach may simply leave too many women unprotected and unable
to share their stories as individual states attempt independent legisla-
tive reform. Wallace’s argument in favor of redefining self-defense
is similarly with merit but also not without challenges, namely a
wholesale approach to reform that likely exceeds the political will
of state legislatures.
Reforming the Federal Rules of Evidence presents a viable mid-
dle ground to the state-by-state approach and Wallace’s wholesale
reform. Obviously any reform at the federal level would still depend
on incorporation at the state level.170 Reform at the federal level, how-
ever, may well still prove more feasible than reform in fifty different
state legislatures.
Ultimately the goal of amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is
to provide greater legal recognition and protection for women who
suffer abuse at the hands of their domestic partners. As a society, the
United States ought not to continue to tolerate a legal system that
loses three women a day to domestic violence and sees another woman
assaulted by her partner every nine seconds. Amending the Federal
Rules of Evidence is a viable means of providing at least some recogni-
tion and protection for those women suffering from BWS should they
turn to the courts for justice.
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170. Not only is this technically true but it is also practically true. Given that the types
of crimes in which BWS testimony comes up is usually a matter of state law (e.g., domestic
violence and murder), reform at the federal level would have a minimal initial impact with-
out state adoption of analogous BWS provisions.
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